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Abstract
We explore the nature of Business Groups, that is network-like forms of hierarchical organization
between legally autonomous rms spanning both within and across national borders. Exploiting
a unique dataset of 270,474 headquarters controlling more than 1,500,000 (domestic and foreign)
a liates in all countries worldwide, we nd that business groups account for a signi cant part of
value-added generation in both developed and developing countries, with a prevalence in the latter.
In order to characterize their boundaries, we distinguish between an a liate vs. a group-level index
of vertical integration, as well as an entropy-like metric able to summarize the hierarchical complexity of a group and its trade-o between exploitation of knowledge as an input across the hierarchy
and the associated communication costs. We relate these metrics to host country institutional
characteristics, as well as to the performance of a liates across usiness groups. Conditional on
institutional quality, a negative correlation exists between vertical integration and organizational
complexity in de ning the boundaries of business groups. We also nd a robust (albeit non-linear)
positive relationship between a group's organizational complexity and productivity which dominates the already known correlation between vertical integration and productivity. Results are in
line with the theoretical framework of knowledge-based hierarchies developed by the literature, in
which intangible assets are a complementary input in the production processes.
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Introduction

"The economics literature has not had much to say about non-standard organizational forms [...] now much discussed in
the business and organizational literatures, including joint ventures, strategic alliances, networks, business groups, clans,
and virtual organizations". [Baker et al., 2001b]

The emergence of Business Groups (BG) is traditionally considered a phenomenon typical of countries at an early stage of development: in order to circumvent market imperfections,

rms with a

formally autonomous legal status are put under a common control exerted by a parent entity in a
network-like hierarchical organization of economic activities1 . These organizational forms thus provide at the same time incentives to self-inforce promises of cooperation among units of production,
given the control exerted by a common parent, without giving up the advantage (if and when necessary) of organizing activities within a market-like environment, since each a liate maintains formal
property rights on its production assets.
Under this general de nition, also multinational enterprises (MNEs) can be considered as Business
Groups, since one of their distinctive features is to organize legally autonomous a liates spanning
across di erent countries under the common management of a unique headquarter. The latter is
con rmed by a cursory glance at the data: the top 100 largest multinational enterprises by international
assets listed by UNCTAD (2011) are all organized as cross-border BGs, with an average of 330 a liates
in 64 countries each, and up to 10 di erent hierarchical levels of control.
In order to characterize the phenomenon of Business Groups (also encompassing MNEs under this
general de nition) and derive the ensuing implications in terms of determinants of a rm's boundaries,
we map 270,374 headquarters controlling 1,519,588 a liates worldwide in 2010, across all industries.2
As we have individual balance sheet data for (most of) these rms, we are able to recover a total
(unconsolidated) value added accruable to Business Groups of some 27.9 US$ trillion. Moreover, the
largest BGs (headquarters with more than 100 a liates worldwide) constitute less than 1% of groups
in our sample, but account for 72% of the total value-added of BGs measured in the data. In a
nutshell, in our data some 2,000 Business Groups worldwide account for around 20 US$ trillion of
(unconsolidated) value added in year 2010.
In terms of trade ows, a reading of the US BEA (2012) data along the dimension of Business
Groups reveals that at least 75% of US trade can be linked to rms organized as multinational BGs.3 A
similar exercise for France, where transaction- and rm-level data have been matched to the ownership
1

Across geography and time, the di erent notions of chaebol in South Korea, keiretsu in Japan, konzerne in Germany
all make reference to the idea of clusters of rms under common control. Khanna and Yafeh (2007) provide a survey of
Business Groups' presence in emerging countries. Jones and Colpan (2010) or Fruin (2008) explore their importance in
the early history of industrialized nations.
2
Our source of data is ORBIS, a global dataset containing detailed balance sheet information for some 100 million
companies worldwide. In addition, the database contains information on over 30 million shareholder/subsidiary links,
when relevant. The database has been signi cantly expanded since 2009, with a better coverage of countries traditionally
not well mapped such as Japan and the United States. More detailed information on the dataset, as well as its validation
across countries, is discussed in Section 2.
3
The US BEA (2012) reports that in 2009 foreign a liates located in the United States accounted for 20.8 percent of
the country's exports and 31.1 percent of imports of goods. At the same time, U.S. exports of goods associated to US
multinationals were 54.7 percent of total exports of goods, while the similar gure for imports was 45.1 percent. As a
result, 75.5 percent of total U.S. exports and 76.2 percent of total U.S. imports of goods in 2009 can be considered as
Business-Group related.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper784

2

2

Altomonte and Rungi: Business Groups as Hierarchies of Firms: Determinants of Ver

structure of companies, reveals that some 65% of total French imports or exports can be reconducted
to rms (domestic or foreign-owned) that are part of a Business Group structure (Altomonte et al.,
2012).
Notwithstanding the economic relevance of BGs, the theory of the rm has been relatively silent
on these organizational forms, with most authors implicitly assuming that these structures could be
epitomized by a simple two-dimensional decision problem at a rm-level: whether to source intermediate inputs from within the rm or not, i.e. the vertical integration decision; and whether to locate
an economic activity in the country of origin or abroad, i.e. the o shoring decision.
The vertical integration decision has been explored by a vast literature modelling incomplete
contracts and rm boundaries, based on the seminal works of Williamson (1971, 1975, 1985), Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). The o shoring decision, instead, has been theoretically
studied among others by Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005), Antras (2003), Antras and
Helpman (2004, 2009).4
A common nding of this literature is that rm boundaries depend on institutional frictions. In
particular, Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) are the rst to empirically investigate the combined
impact of nancial and contracting institutions on vertical integration decisions, nding vertical integration to be positively correlated with the interaction term between contracting institutions and
nancial frictions. From a slightly di erent perspective, Alfaro et al. (2011) nd that similar levels
of protectionism, hence trade institutions, imply also similar levels of vertical integration. Alfaro
and Charlton (2009) investigate vertical FDI activities and nd that these are not explained by host
countries' comparative advantages, as a liates tend to be rather proximate to parents both in vertical
integration and skill content. Nunn (2007) or Nunn and Tre er (2008) provide instead an empirical support for the main tenets of the literature on the o shoring decision, relating the contracting
environment of a supplier's inputs to the share of US imports that are intra- rm.
All these papers neglect however the possibility that the decisions on vertical integration or o shoring can be undertaken considering the organizational form of a Business Group, an option that
generates a number of additional trade-o s in the de nition of rms' boundaries.5
Consider for example the case of two ex-ante similar Business Groups present in our dataset:
General Motors and Mitsubishi. Both groups have a century-old tradition in the production of motor
vehicles in their own country of origin (the US and Japan). Moreover, in 2010 our data report that
these two groups have a similar size, as they control 659 and 652 a liates in 54 and 32 countries,
respectively.6 Still, when looking at industrial activities beyond motor vehicles, Mitsubishi is involved
4

See among others the surveys by Holmstrom and Tirole (1989), Whinston (2001), Joskow (2005), Helpman (2006),
Antras and Rossi-Hansberg (2009), Aghion and Holden (2011).
5
The only attempt we have found to explicitely model a theory of business networks is in Kali (1999; 2003). However,
also in his approach Business Groups are the result of either a limited contract enforcement or imperfect capital markets,
with their nature thus essentially reconducted to the 'dual' nature of rm boundaries, without mentioning the implications
of rms'hierarchies. On the other hand, the literature on hierarchies has traditionally been con ned to organizational
issues stemming from managerial incentives within, rather than across, individual rms' boundaries (Bloom, Sadun
and Van Reenen, 2012; Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Marin and Verdier, 2009; Grossman and Helpman 2004).
Alternatively, the issue has been considered as yet another aspect of rms' size in the nance literature (Acharya, Myers
and Rajan, 2011; Rajan and Zingales, 2001a, 2001b; Kumar, Rajan and Zingales, 1999).
6
Alfaro and Charlton (2009) also recall the GM case and enlist 2,248 'entities' belonging to the GM network in 1999,
making however no di erence between a liates/subsidiaries and branches/divisions as we do (see infra). However some
major events have occurred to GM since 1999. In 2005 the group conclusively sold its participations in electronics
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in some ten lines of business (e.g. electronic products, aircraft, shipbuilding, petroleum products,
chemical products, primary metals, food & beverages, bank and insurance, real estate), while GM
beyond motor vehicles provides only nancial services for its customers. Accordingly, the a liates of
Mitsubishi are able to provide a wider range of intermediate inputs to the group, with rms typically
operating in 3 or 4 main di erent industries, whereas the a liates of General Motors seem relatively
more focused on one or two main intermediate activities. As a result, the degree of vertical integration
is higher for Mitsubishi than GM. Crucially, however, Mitsubishi is signi cantly less complex in terms
of organization, with a much atter hierarchical structure (with no more than 3 levels of hierarchy
within the group), while GM is characterized by a deeper (up to 8 levels) and more complex hierarchy
of cross-participations in its a liates. Moreover, we also nd that the labor productivity of a liates
belonging to the hierarchically more complex GM group is on average signi cantly larger than the one
of Mitsubishi's a liates.
The latter evidence, showing that vertical integration choices are not independent from decisions on
the organization of the hierarchy of rms across groups, is systematic and statistically signi cant across
our sample once we control for institutional characteristics of the host countries. Also, the nding
that higher levels of complexity in hierarchies, rather than vertical integration levels, are positively
associated with the average productivity of a liates operating within a given group (controlling for
the location and the main activity of a liates and headquarters) is sistematic in our data.
In exploring these issues, the paper thus provides a number of contributions to the literature. First,
thanks to the richness of our dataset encompassing information on roughly 1,800,000 rms between
headquarters and a liates worldwide, we aim at providing a preliminary comprehensive picture of the
phenomenon of Business Groups across the globe. Two thirds of our BGs are originated in OECD
economies, whose headquarters own about 76% of a liates worldwide. The ratio of foreign to domestic
a liates is smaller for groups originating from developing countries (around .3), since these countries
have a relatively larger proportion of rms organized as domestic business groups (Khanna and Yafeh,
2007), while the ratio is highest for the US (.85), where Business Group structures tend to operate
abroad rather than domestically.7 We also nd individual a liates of BGs to be systematically larger,
more productive and more capital intensive vs.

rms not operating within these structures, in line

with the ndings of Atalay et al. (2012).
As a second contribution, we improve on the exercise of Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton, (henceforth AJM, 2009) who have studied the determinants of vertical integration in a large cross-country
dataset. With respect to their analysis, we re ne the notion of vertical integration by nesting in the
latter measure an I/O matrix which is speci c to the group structure, thus being able to distinguish
between group- and a liate-level vertical integration. We nd this distinction to be relevant in our
data, as it allows for a better identi cation of the relationship between institutional characteristics and
vertical integration measures. The intuition here is that estimating vertical integration in a sample
of rms in which each BG's a liate is considered as an independent rm, as the literature has done
production (Hughes Electronics, Electro-Motive) and in 2006 left to Toyota the control of Subaru, Suzuki and Isuzu.
As a consequence of the industrial restructuring undertaken in 2009, GM has given up production of some brands (e.g.
Pontiac, Oldsmobile) and the European division has almost completely dissolved, leaving only Opel in Germany in charge
of the remaining activities.
7
This nding is generally consistent with the idea that the boundaries of the rm should be larger in the presence of
a poor institutional environment and thus higher transaction costs.
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insofar, would miss the structural correlation in vertical integration linking a liates of the same group,
thus generating potentially biased results. This feature of rms' boundaries shaped as Business Group,
with the ensuing implications, has been neglected insofar in the analyses on vertical integration.
A third contribution hinges on the literature on organization and hierarchies. Borrowing from
graph theory, we develop a measure of complexity applicable to any hierarchical organization (including
Business Groups), which is consistent with theoretical models of knowledge-based hierarchies (as for
example in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), where a trade-o can arise between the exploitation
of knowledge as an intangible input and its communication along the hierarchy. The measure is
retrieved as a variation of the node entropy of a hierarchical graph, and is continuous and additive
in the number of levels. In our sample the measure is also Pareto-distributed across groups, in line
with the previously mentioned concentration of economic activity in the largest (and organizationally
more complex) groups. Throughout the paper we show how hierarchical complexity interacts with
the (re ned) measures on vertical integration, so as to derive a more precise characterization of the
boundaries of Business Groups.
We use these novel data and re ned metrics to generate a number of results. Consistently with
the property rights theory of the rm, we nd that better institutions lead to less vertical integration,
both at the group and at the a liate level. Moreover, BGs that have a high internal degree of vertical integration (between headquarter and a liates) also tend to have relatively unspecialized (more
integrated) a liates. Interestingly, the a liate and its group are at the margin less similar in terms
of vertical integration in `good' institutional environments, as a higher contract enforcement and/or
a better nancial development allow the single a liate to specialize more, exchanging fewer inputs
with coa liates and the parent. Moreover, conditional on the quality of institutions, a negative correlation arises between vertical integration and organizational complexity: for a given level of nancial
development, more specialized (less integrated) a liates end up within more complex organizational
structures. Contractual enforcement yields a similar trade-o , but less robust.
We also nd that the positive relationship between vertical integration and a liates' productivity
emerging in our data is not robust to the inclusion of a group's organizational complexity, thus
providing yet another piece of evidence on the importance of considering jointly vertical integration
and organizational complexity decisions in assessing BGs. Our result of a positive correlation between
organizational complexity and productivity within BGs' a liates (controlling for vertical integration)
complements the nding of Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2012) in the case of US rms, according to
which much of the correlation between a rm's performance and its vertical structure fades away when
controlling for a generic measure of rm size. The result is also consistent with the economic rationale
provided by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Garicano and Hubbard (2007), according to
which best intangible assets (such as best managers, best managerial practices) can be shared in
presence of a larger number of units of production (in our case more complex hierarchies) and hence
their cost can be smoothed on a larger scale.
The relevance of intangible assets is also con rmed by the fact that the relationship between
organizational complexity and productivity is non-linear: above a certain threshold of complexity
(around 550 a liates and/or 5 levels of control) the relationship becomes negative. This result is in
line with the microfoundation provided by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), in which a minimum
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e cient scale exists in the acquisition and communication of knowledge throughout the hierarchy,
associated however to the emergence of endogenous communication costs of additional management
layers, which should increase with complexity. Such an evidence of marginally decreasing returns from
increasing complexity is relevant, as it puts a natural limit to the growth in complexity of business
groups: indeed, only 1% of groups in our sample exceed this average `optimal' organizational threshold.
The same theoretical framework of Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) can also explain another
result we have obtained when distinguishing between hierarchical complexity (which takes into account
the overall density of a liates at each level of the control hierarchy) and the simple hierarchical
distance, i.e. the length of the command chain linking each a liate to the parent company. In
general, we

nd that the further the

rm is from the decision making center, the lower its level

of productivity appears to be; however, the latter result only holds when we control for our main
measure of organizational complexity. When considering only hierarchical distance in the model
(itself a raw proxy of organizational complexity), a liates located at further levels of control would
actually display higher levels of productivity. Our data are thus consistent with the idea that further
layers of management allow for the exploitation of economies of scale for knowledge inputs, and
hence a liates to bigger (more complex) networks are relatively more productive. At the same time,
subsidiaries located at further hierarchical distances from the headquarter discount a higher cost of
communication and show (at the margin) a negative productivity premium.
One nal caveat is worth mentioning: throughout the analysis we have explored the boundaries of
Business Groups with respect to the `make or buy' (vertical integration) decision, which we have then
interacted with the extent of hierarchical complexity of the same group. We have instead considered as
given the decision on whether to locate production at home or abroad, thus encompassing multinational
enterprises as a subset of Business Groups. Hence, while in the analysis we always control for the
potentially di erent behavior of foreign vs. domestic a liates, in this paper we do not explicitly model
the drivers of a foreign investment decision.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we derive a general de nition of Business Groups on
the basis of the existing literature and introduce our dataset, providing at the same time some stylized
facts. In Section 3 we construct our metrics of vertical integration and organizational complexity and
describe their properties. Section 4 relates our metrics of group boundaries to the home and host
countries institutions in which BGs operate, as well as to the performance of a liate rms within
groups. Section 5 presents further lines of research and concludes.

2
2.1

The nature of Business Groups
De nition of Business Group

A commonly accepted de nition of Business Groups does not exist in the economic or business literature, with Williamson (1975) already hinting at the fact that BGs should be located somewhere
between markets and hierarchies.8
8
Business and sociological studies also pointed out the di culty to classify network-like forms of organization through
a simple dichotomy of markets and hierarchies (see for example Powell, 1990; Granovetter, 1995; Hennart, 1991, 1993).
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In their survey article, Khanna and Yafeh (2007) consider Business Groups as operating in multiple
and often unrelated markets, but observe that they are formed by clusters of legally distinct rms
with a common management, a characteristic that makes them di erent from multidivisional forms of
organization. The nance literature emphasizes the groups' pyramidal structure built by a controlling
shareholder through a chain of equity ties, and the possible con icts of interests arising with minority
shareholders (La Porta et al, 1999; Almeida and Wolfensohn, 2006). The focus of the industrial
organization literature is instead on the creation of production chains through vertical integration
within and across industries (see for example the survey by Lafontaine and Slade, 2007) or, in the case
of international trade, through o shoring to foreign countries (among others Antras, 2003; Grossman
and Helpman, 2004). The phenomenon of BGs has also been extensively explored by the business
literature, with a variety of di erent de nitions summarized by Colpan and Hikino (2010). Brie y,
scholars from di erent elds usually emphasize some attributes mostly related to their own eld of
study, generally ending with a working de nition suitable for their research scope.
In this paper we argue that the lowest common denominator of all existing approaches is rooted
in the nature of Business Groups as hybrid organizations of economic activities, halfway between
markets and hierarchies. As such, BGs are thus able to exchange intermediate goods and services on
the market, but possibly through a transfer price; they can relocate nancial resources across a liates,
but at more favorable conditions if confronted with external nancing, via the development of internal
capital markets; they coordinate management decisions through majority stakes in controlled assets,
but have to consider as well minority shareholders' protection. More generally, they have a exible form
of assets' ownership that provides at the same time incentives to self-inforce promises of cooperation
among a liates, given the control exerted by a common parent, without giving up the advantage
(if and when necessary) of organizing activities within a market-like environment, since each a liate
maintains formal property rights on its production assets.9
We can thus de ne a Business Group as a set of at least two legally autonomous rms whose
economic activity is coordinated through some form of hierarchical control via equity stakes. Legal
autonomy and hierarchy are jointly constituent attributes of BGs, distinguishing them from independent rms (as these are legally autonomous but operate without hierarchies) and from multidivisional
rms (which are organized through internal hierarchies of branches, but without autonomous legal
status).10
Given the requirement of hierarchical control, our de nition rules out strategic business alliances
but includes in principle joint ventures, since their assets are owned (and controlled) by more than
one proprietary rm. Under this general de nition, multinational enterprises (MNEs) can also be
considered as a special case of Business Groups, since they have by de nition at least one legally
autonomous a liate located abroad, ultimately controlled by a parent located in the origin country.
9
To this end, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2001a, 2001b) introduce the notion of relational contract: the decision to
integrate or not is seen as dynamic in nature, as a repeated game, subordinate to the establishment of the parties' long
term relationship. From this perspective, the emergence of Business Groups can be seen as a way to establish a superior
relational contract, which facilitates integration or non-integration whenever needed.
10
The notions of branches/divisions and subsidiaries/a liates tend to overlap in some contexts. In this paper, in
accordance with international standards (for example UNCTAD, 2009) we de ne a branch as a new location, division,
department or o ce that is set up by a corporation, yet still within the original company's legal boundary. We will
alternatively use the term subsidiary or a liate for a legally independent company controlled by a parent.
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In the case instead of economic entities with more than one productive plant (multi-plant rms),
if all plants are commanded by the same rm under a single legal status we consider them as branches
of that rm, as plants have no form of control on the production assets. On the other hand, if a plant
has autonomous legal status, we consider it as an autonomous rm, thus either independent or an
a liate to a Business Group.
Our de nition is wide enough to include either very simple groups with two rms, a headquarter
and one a liate, or very complex groups with hundreds of domestic and/or foreign a liates linked
by hierarchical control. Hence, we rule out any ad hoc de nition in terms of minimum number of
a liates or industries, as found in some management or business literature (e.g. Colpan and Hikino,
2010).

2.2

Data

Having de ned a Business Group as a combination of rms with autonomous legal status under some
form of hierarchical control, the main di culty in constructing a dataset on BGs is related to the
identi cation of the notion of control exerted by a parent on a liates.
We opt here for a de nition of control as established in international standards for multinational
corporations (OECD 2005; UNCTAD, 2009; Eurostat, 2007), where control is assumed if (directly or
indirectly, e.g. via another controlled a liate) the parent exceeds the majority (50.01%) of voting
rights of the a liate and can thus be considered as the Ultimate Controlling Institution / Ultimate
Bene cial Owner.11 Such a notion of control is not exhaustive, as it leaves outside the boundaries of
BGs a liates de facto controlled through minority ownership (<50%) as a result of a more fragmented
property, or peculiar forms of control derived by some form of market advantage (e.g. a monopsony),
as well as particular forms of government regulations (e.g. 'golden shares'). Yet, it has some clear
advantages. First, the majority (50.01%) of voting rights criterion creates a unique standard for
both domestic and multinational Business Groups. Second, it allows to rule out cases of double (or
triple) accounting of a liates among di erent groups, thus generating a de nition of the boundaries
of a BG which is univocal (technically, each of our business groups is a closed set). Third, such
an approximation of control allows for a straightforward comparison with o cial statistics, as it is
commonly used in international standards on foreign a liates (Eurostat or OECD FATS) and for
international tax purposes (IAS, IFRS).12
Figure 1 represents the organization of a typical Business Group as it can be derived by the
application of the majority ownership notion of control. Such a representation corresponds to a
mathematical object known as a hierarchical graph.13 The upper shaded node (1) represents the
11

Control derived by voting power, i.e. majority ownership, can be obtained through either direct or indirect crossparticipations. A company X can control 60% of shares of company A, which controls 70% of shares of company B.
Although company X does not formally control company B directly, it does indirectly, via company A. The latter, known
as the principle of the Ultimate Controlling Institution in OECD FATS Statistics (or Ultimate Bene cial Owner in
UNCTAD data), allows to assign control of company B to company X, thus called the parent company.
12
A potential drawback of this methodology is that it can lead to an overestimation of control in some bigger networks
of a liates. See infra for a validation of our data and Vitali et al. (2011) for a reference on this issue.
13
Technically, a hierarchical graph is a particular variation of a at graph to which at least one parent node is added
so as to assign functions to the other nodes (Palacz, 2003). Hierarchical graphs in turn are a generalization of a tree
graph, in which several arms depart from one vertex as in a tree, but two di erent nodes are connected by only one
edge; in hierarchical graphs, instead, di erent ultimate vertices can be directly or indirectly connected through several
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Figure 1: Business Groups as hierarchical graphs

headquarter (or parent company), conventionally placed at level 0 of the hierarchy. The lower shaded
nodes below level 0 represent the a liates considered to be inside the boundaries of the same group,
on their di erent hierarchical levels, with the edges connecting the nodes representing participation
links.14 The white nodes are instead rms possibly participated by the considered BG, but excluded
from its boundaries on the basis of the majority ownership threshold.
Two di erent sorts of data have been combined to retrieve Business Groups: worldwide proprietary
linkages provided by the Ownership Database by Bureau Van Dijk and rm-level nancial accounts,
from Orbis, by the same Bureau van Dijk.15 Both proprietary linkages and nancial data refer to the
last available information available in year 2010. In Appendix A we provide a detailed description of
our data sources and of the methodology we employ to identify Business Groups.
After considering (direct and indirect) control through majority ownership, we end up with 270,374
headquarters of Business Groups controlling a total of 1,519,588 a liates in 207 countries in the year
2010. Given our hierarchical graph structure, rm-level data of a liates are strati ed according to
their position in each Business Group, taking into account the level of proprietary distance from
the headquarter. For each headquarter and each a liate along the control chain we have industry
a liations at the 6-digit NAICS classi cation, including both primary and secondary activities, from
which we can infer measures of vertical integration, as well as balance sheet data, from which we
retrieve proxies of performance and productivity.
Not all rms in our dataset report a complete set of nancial data. Moreover, country-level data
for some institutional variables we use as controls are not available for every country. Hence, while
edges. Hence, di erent from a tree graph, in hierarchical graphs a parent node can coordinate other nodes at di erent
hierarchical levels. Such a property makes them particularly suitable to visualize complex organization patterns such as
the one represented by a BG.
14
In this graph we interpret edges as control participations, but in a generic hierarchy of rms they could also represent
trade ows of intermediate goods and services, or information ows for coordinated management actions.
15
Other recent studies, including Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) or Alfaro, Conconi, Fadinger and Newman
(2010), exploit data sourced by Dun & Bradstreet (D&B). The latter is one of the sources now integrated in the Ownership
Database by Bureau Van Dijk. For further details on the original data sources, see Appendix A.
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we discuss here the complete dataset to introduce stylized facts on Business Groups, in our empirical
strategies we rely on a restricted sample of data in which both rm-level and country-level information
are available. The restricted dataset still encompasses 208,181 headquarters (groups) controlling a total
of 1,005,381 a liates in some 129 countries. The general properties described here also hold for the
restricted sample of Business Groups.
In Table 1 we provide a geographical coverage of the whole sample by some main countries/areas.
The headquarters of Business Groups (parents) are classi ed by their home country in the second
column, while in the third column we report the total number of a liates they control worldwide,
either domestically or abroad, a distinction provided respectively in column 4 (domestic a liates) and
5 (a liates abroad, i.e. outward FDI by parents). In the last column we report the foreign a liates
located in the economy as the result of an inward FDI activity from parents abroad. Two thirds of
Business Groups are originated in OECD economies, and those groups own around 76% of a liates
worldwide. The European Union, in particular, is in charge of 48% of a liates, of which one third is
located abroad. More than 50% of a liates are located outside the home country in groups originating
from OECD countries, especially in the US (85%), while the proportion is lower in developing countries
(around 30%), where groups tend to be domestic.
Confronting the last two columns of Table 1, we observe a positive di erence between outward
and inward FDI stock (as proxied by number of a liates) in developed economies, in particular in the
case of US and Japan, where the number of a liates located abroad outnumbers respectively more
than twofold and fourfold the number of foreign a liates located in the economy. European Union
members seem an exception, but in that case it is intra-EU FDI activities that makes the net position
almost in balance. In developing countries the inward FDI stock of rms is almost twice as large as
the outward one.
Table 1: Geographic coverage of Business Groups by headquarters and a liates

Economy
OECD
non-OECD

N. of parents
N. of affiliates
(Business Groups)
(A + B)
177,306
1,148,011
93,068
371,577

Domestic
Affiliates abroad Foreign affiliates
affiliates (A)
(B)
located in economy
757,778
390,233
324,255
295,882
75,695
141,673

European Union
US
Rest of the world
of which:
Japan
Latin America
Middle East
China
Africa
ASEAN

144,562
9,935
115,877

735,487
211,265
572,836

496,209
114,364
421,441

239,278
96,901
151,395

258,060
40,404
167,464

14,236
3,972
3,130
1,922
1,095
1,870

119,374
11,480
18,008
24,868
10,733
26,333

102,306
7,106
7,675
18,146
5,961
15,272

17,068
4,374
10,333
6,722
4,772
11,061

4,351
18,656
9,147
17,494
12,298
15,578

Total

270,374

1,519,588

1,053,660

465,928

465,928

To validate our dataset we can rely on few references since, to the best of our knowledge, there
is no similar dataset covering control chains of corporate activities both domestically and abroad.
One exception is the World Investment Report of UNCTAD, which compiles yearly a list of the
biggest corporations currently operating in the world, all present in our dataset with their a liates.
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UNCTAD (2011) also reports the number of parents and a liates involved in FDI activities hosted
by each country. Based on these data, in Figure 2 we report the correlation between the number of
headquarters controlling foreign a liates abroad (left panel) and the number of foreign a liates (right
panel) located in each country as retrieved from our sample, against the similar gures provided by
UNCTAD (2011): correlations are .94 and .93, respectively.16

0

0

(log of) N. sample foreign affiliates
5
10

(log of) N. of sample multinational parents
2
4
6
8

Figure 2: Sample validation: (Logs of) numbers of multinational parents and foreign a liates by host
country in the sample and in UNCTAD (2011)

0

2
4
6
8
(log of) N. of multinational parents UNCTAD (2011)

10

0

5
(log of) N. of foreign affiliates in UNCTAD (2011)

10

Finally, an indirect validation of the data is reported in Altomonte et al. (2012). In that paper,
the authors have matched transaction- and rm-level data for France to the ownership structure of
companies as derived from our dataset, in order to estimate the amount of intra- rm (intra-group) and
arm's length (non intra-group) exports of French rms to the US in 2009. Looking at the counterfactual
of o cial data on US intra- rm and arms' length imports from France, as retrieved from the US Census
Bureau, the two trade ows match very closely.

2.3

Stylized facts on Business Groups

Table 2 shows how rms that are a liated to Business Groups are on average bigger than non-a liated
rms along di erent dimensions (see Appendix A for information on the control group of non-a liated
rms): they employ on average 88% more workers, their sales are larger, they are usually more capitalintensive and almost twice more pro table. They are also 4% more productive, even after controlling
for size and capital-intensity. Moreover, a liation premia do not display dramatic di erences between
OECD and non-OECD economies.
In addition to the superior performance of BGs' a liates, another typical characteristic found in
the literature on heterogeneous rms is the remarkable skewness of the underlying distributions. In
terms of hierarchies, the left panel of Figure 3 shows that 57% of rms in our dataset represent very
16
The original source for data on a liates in UNCTAD (2011) is Dun &Bradstreet, that is one of the sources of
ownership data on which the ORBIS database also relies. The survey of UNCTAD (2011) refers to data in 2009, while
our data are updated to 2010. We have excluded from the validation reported in Figure 2 the datapoint on China,
since the country does not adopt the international standard de nition of control (>50.01%) in reporting the number of
a liates, preferring a less committal criterion of `foreign-funded enterprises', leading to non comparable gures.
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Table 2: Premia for a liates of Business Groups vs non-a liated rms

Binary regressions with country-per-industry xed e ects; **, ***
stand for signi cance respectively at 5% and 1%; (1) Capital-intensity
added as a further control for a one-factor measure of productivity. See
Appendix A for details on the control group of non-a liates.

simple organizations consisting of one headquarter and one a liate, while about 13% of groups have
more than ve a liates and only 0.7% of headquarters control more than 100 a liates. However,
the right panel of Figure 3 also shows that those 0.7% of groups with more than 100 a liates are
responsible for more than 70% of value added recorded in our data.
The skewness in the distribution is in any case heterogeneous across countries, as shown in Table
3. US corporate groups tend to be larger, with an average size of 21 a liates against a total average
of 5, with largest groups operating in the nancial industry and some in manufacturing. In Asian
countries (Japan, China and the ASEAN region) we also detect the existence of conglomerates with
a higher number of a liates on each percentile of the distribution, as well as groups that tend to be
internally engaged in all sectors of economic activities, from manufacturing to services.17 In the case
of Africa and Middle East, on the other hand, most of the bigger groups are active in the extraction of
natural resources and related activities. European groups are on average smaller in terms of number of
a liates but there is a considerable di erence between northern countries (Germany, Sweden, Finland,
France) and southern countries (Italy and Spain), with the BGs originating from 'core' Europe being
usually bigger than the ones originated in Southern Europe.
In the next Section we rely on the property rights theory of the rm and try to make sense of such
a cross-country heterogeneity by linking some speci c characteristics of Business Groups to the host
countries' institutional environment.
17

This is an inheritance of the former keiretsu or chaebol business groupings in countries like Japan or S. Korea,
respectively.
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Figure 3: Size distribution of Business Groups, number of a liates vs value added

3

a) Overall distribution of a liates of Business Groups

b) Overall distribution of value added of Business

(size classes)

Groups (size classes)

Metrics for Business Groups

3.1

Group vs. A liate Vertical Integration

Acemoglu, Jones and Mitton (2009) have explored in their paper the determinants of vertical integration in a large dataset of rms. They found that the contemporary presence of higher contracting
costs and better nancial development is associated to a higher rm-level vertical integration. That is,
a single rm widens its boundary of economic activities in presence of both poor contract enforcement
and good nancial development, while contracting and nancing constraints, individually considered,
seem to have no e ect on vertical integration.18
In absence of actual data on internal shipments of intermediate goods and services across rms,
AJM (2009) proposed to proxy vertical integration exploiting the information on the set of industries
in which a rm is engaged, combined with the input coe cient requirements that link those industries
as retrieved from input-output tables. A rm-level index was therefore calculated summing up all
input-output coe cients that linked each rm's primary activity to the secondary activities in which
it was involved. The assumption is thus that a rm engaged in more industries, where backward
and forward linkages in production are important, is supposed to have a higher capacity to source
internally more inputs for its nal output.19
In deriving these results, AJM(09) have however treated each rm in their sample as independent,
that is neglecting the possibility that the degree of vertical integration can be a function of the
coordinated management decision of a Business Group, where the decision to "make or buy" can be
18

They also found that the impact of contractual frictions was more important in industries where holdup problems
were more relevant. Hence, once industrial composition was accounted for, they concluded that some countries with a
generalized problem of contractual incompleteness simply specialize in sectors where more vertical integration naturally
occurs, that is in sectors where technologies are less advanced.
19
For a previous attempt in the business literature, on which Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) have built, see
Fan and Lang (2000). For a similar application of this index see Alfaro et al. (2011).
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Table 3: Descriptives of size distribution of a liates by main countries/areas of origin

Home country

Mean

OECD
non-OECD
European Union
US
Rest of the world
of which:
Japan
Latin America
Middle East
China
Africa
ASEAN
Total

50 perc

75 perc

95 perc

99 perc

Max

6
4

1
1

3
2

17
13

94
46

2,707
996

5
21
5

1
3
1

3
9
3

13
92
15

65
354
60

2,557
2,707
1,672

8
3
6
13
10
14

1
1
1
3
2
5

4
2
4
9
9
13

31
8
19
40
42
50

119
37
69
127
116
155

1,000
229
492
574
455
479

5

1

3

16

74

2,707

Descriptives reported by main countries/areas according to the
origin of the parent company.

di erentiated between headquarters and a liates or across the same a liates, as shown by the GM
vs. Mitsubishi example.
To take into account the latter dimension, we have slightly re ned the original AJM(09) index of
vertical integration. First, we consider two layers of integration: the group-level, which is the result
of all production activities performed by a liates and headquarter altogether; and the a liate-level,
that is the propensity of each a liate to exchange intermediates within the network represented by the
group. Second, we take into account the number of lines of business in which a BG and its constituent
rms can be involved.
In particular, we assume that within a group two sets of activities can be identi ed: a set of output
activities j 2 NH , and a set of intermediate activities i 2 NA . The set of output activites coincides

with the primary and secondary activities of the headquarter (NH ), whereas the range of intermediate

activities at the group-level is represented by the set of primary and secondary activites in which
controlled a liates (NA ) are involved.
With these assumptions, we can build a group-speci c input-output table as the one illustrated in
Figure 4, where we report outputs in columns and inputs by row and where each combination V Iij is
the ith coe cient requirement to produce the jth output.
As in AJM(09) or Alfaro et al. (2011), we assume that industrial backward and forward linkages for
all rms in our sample can be proxied by US input-output tables and adopt the industrial classi cation
provided by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, with 61 main industries mainly at a 3-digit level of
disaggregation of the NAICS classi cation. In Appendix B we report the correspondence between the
NAICS codes we retrieve from our data and the industries reported by the US Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
By summing up input coe cient requirements by column in Figure 4 we obtain the vertical inte-
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Figure 4: A group-speci c input-output table

gration for each line of business in which the Business Group is involved.20 To retrieve the vertical
integration index for the whole group, we average the total of all input coe cient requirements (V Iij )
by the number of output activities (jNH j), thus correcting for the potential conglomerate nature of
the group.

The result is the following group-speci c (g) vertical integration index:
vg =

X

i2NA
j2NH

1
V Iij
jNH j

(1)

where V Iij are the input coe cient requirements for any output activity j 2 NH sourcing from all

input activities j 2 NA . The group-speci c vertical integration index can range from 0 to 1, where 1
corresponds to complete vertical integration.

The latter however does not capture the full picture of a BG's possible spectrum of choices in
de ning its boundaries. In fact, Business Groups could report similar levels of vertical integration
at the level of headquarters, but they can organize each a liate in a more or less integrated way,
according to the organizational structure of the group across industries. The latter is the case of
GM vs. Mitsubishi: as discussed, the former is a relatively specialized group, while the Japanese
conglomerate is involved in more than ten lines of business. And yet, calculating an index of vertical
integration at the level of headquarters as above (vg ) would yield similar results across the two groups.
The reason is that a liates in these two groups have themselves di erent degrees of vertical integration,
which `compensate' for the ex-ante di erent diversi cation of the headquarters' activities (a liates of
Mitsubishi tend to be bigger and present in more diversi ed sourcing industries then the ones of GM).
It then follows that estimating vertical integration in a sample that considers each BG's a liate
as an independent

rm would clearly miss the structural correlation linking a liates of the same

group, thus generating potentially biased results. This is an important feature of Business Groups'
20

As in AJM(09), in absence of actual data on internal shipments of intermediates, we can interpret this number as
a mere propensity to be vertically integrated, where the sum of industry-level requirements gives us only the maximum
possible integration of production processes.
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boundaries which has been previously neglected in the analyses on vertical integration.
To better gauge the di erences in vertical integration strategies across BGs, we thus integrate the
group-index of vertical integration with a measure calculated directly at the individual a liate level.
Here we consider primary or secondary activities of the single a liate as intermediate inputs that can
be supplied potentially to all other co-a liates and to the headquarter, and reclassify them according
to the main industries reported in Appendix B. We end up with the following a liate-speci c (vA )
index of vertical integration:
vA =

X

i 2 Nf
j NH

1
V Iij
jNf j

(2)

where the input coe cient requirements (V Iij ) are taken for any i among single a liate activities
(Nf

NA ) that can lend to any j main activity performed by the headquarter (NH ). Averaging by

the number of main industries in which the single a liate is involved allows again to correct for the
potential conglomerate nature of the a liate itself. In a nutshell, going back to Figure 4, this time
we sum up coe cient requirements by row, then averaging by the number of rows. As well as for the
previous group-speci c index, the a liate-level index can range from 0 to 1 and it can be interpreted
as the propensity of an a liate to be vertically integrated with the rest of the group.
Both the group- and a liate-speci c indices of vertical integration are additive on industries but
not on production units: a new industry adds to the sum of input-output coe cients however small
its contribution can be to the nal output, but more rms can be involved in the same industry. For
these reasons, we expect the group-level index of vertical integration to be higher than the same index
calculated at the a liate-level. In Figure 5 we report the sample distributions of both indexes.

Density

Density

Figure 5: Group-level and a liate-level vertical propensities, sample distributions

0

.2

.4
.6
group vertical integration

.8

0

1

.2

.4
.6
affiliate vertical propensity
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a) Density calculated on a sample of 208,181 groups

b) Density calculated on a sample of 1,005,381

of rms. Mean: .062; standard deviation: .122;

a liates; Mean: .049; standard deviation: .114;

skewness: 2.723.

skewness: 3.189.

1

In our dataset the average vertical integration across groups (vg ) is .062 (that is, on average 6
cents worth of inputs are sourced within groups for a one dollar unit of output), while the same
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gure across individual a liates (va ) is .049. For comparison, the gure obtained by AJM(2009) on
their (unconstrained) sample is of .0487, very similar to the one obtained in our data for the a liatelevel index. Alfaro et al. (2011) also calculated in a similar way a vertical integration index for
manufacturing rms with more than 20 employees, obtaining an average vertical integration of .063
which is similar to the one we obtain for groups.

3.2

Hierarchical complexity

A particularly convenient property of representing Business Group as hierarchical graphs, as in Figure
1, is that it is possible to provide a synthetic measure of their complexity through some hierarchical
form of entropy.
Borrowing from graph theory, it is possible to de ne a concept of entropy for a hierarchical graph
G characterized by a total of L levels of hierarchies by assigning a discrete probability distribution p :
L ! [0; 1] to every level l in the hierarchy, where the probability pl =

nl
N

is a function of the nl number

of nodes on each level l and the total number of nodes N , yielding a measure of node entropy
X

H(G) =

pl log (pl )

(3)

l

which is speci c for hierarchical graphs (Emmert-Streib and Dehmer, 2007).21
The H(G) measure of entropy is characterized by some useful properties: a) it is continuous; b) it
is additive in L, so that each level l (order) of nodes can be considered a subsystem of the whole graph
G; c) the measure is maximal when all the outcomes are equally likely, i.e.there is an equal number of
nodes on each level l. Finally, the logarithmic entropy is also symmetric, meaning that the measure
is unchanged if levels L are re-ordered.
The symmetry of the measure is however an unpleasant property when applied to the case of Business Groups, since it implies that adding one node (a liate) to the network increases its complexity
independently of the hierarchical level at which the node is added, that is

@H(G)
@pm

=

@H(G)
@pn

with m 6= n

being two di erent hierarchical levels. The latter is counter-intuitive in the case of a hierarchical
organization characterized by a headquarter, because one might expect that the degree of coordination of the whole control chain (its `complexity') should increase relatively more when a liates are
incorporated at proprietary levels more distant from the vertex.
For this reason we have re ned the original H(G) formula introducing an additional weight to the
probability distribution of levels more distant from the parent. After some straightforward manipulations we can rewrite our node entropy measure for Business Groups, which we refer to as 'Group
Index of Complexity' (GIC), as:
GIC =

L
X
nl
l log
N
l

N
nl

(4)

where as before the measure is a function of the nl number of a liates on a given hierarchical level l,
of the total number N of a liates belonging to the group and of the total number of levels (L).
De ning pl = nNl implicitly exploits a fundamental postulate in statistical mechanics or thermodynamics according
to which the occupation of any state is assumed to be equally probable. Also note that this formula uses a base-2
logarithm, rather than the natural log, in order to obtain positive marginal complexity for nl > 1.
21
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The index can theoretically range within the [0; +1) interval, with zero now indicating a very
simple organization in which a headquarter controls one or more a liates located just one level of
control below (l = 1). Moreover, the index retains some desirable properties of the original node
entropy, as it is (logarithmically) increasing in the number of hierarchical levels. We provide some
detailed statistical properties of the GIC in Appendix C.
Importantly for our purposes, and contrary to the original hierarchical entropy measure H(G), the
GIC now allows to take into account the marginal increase in complexity brought about by a liates
added to lower hierarchical levels, since

@GIC
@pm

>

@GIC
@pn

for m < n (with pn;m being the usual probability

measures de ned above), provided that nl > l. More speci cally, the logarithmic weight assigned to
the probability term p =

nl
N

of every level is such to increase the measure of complexity when more

subsidiaries are included at di erent lower levels of distance, while the function is decreasing at the
margin when a liates are added at the same level.22
The economic rationale for a decreasing marginal complexity is associated to the idea that some
economies of scale intervene when

rms expand their network of a liates horizontally, with new

a liates entering the network at the same hierarchical level, while coordination costs can become
more and more important once the network enlarges and deepens, locating a liates to further levels
from the headquarter. This is in line with the literature on knowledge-based hierarchies (see for
example Garicano, 2000, or more recently Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), according to which
the optimal design of a management hierarchy is the result of a trade-o

between knowledge and

communication. A further layer of management increases the utilization of knowledge, for which some
economies of scale are assumed, but at the same time it also increases the cost of communication along
the hierarchy.
Accordingly, in our case hierarchical distance from the headquarter implies a higher ` xed cost' of
communication (hence our correction for node entropy in eq. 4), while further a liates on the same
level imply a decreasing `marginal cost'. As a result, the hierarchical complexity of an object such as
a Business Group cannot simply be proxied by its number of a liates or by its number of hierarchical
levels, and the index of complexity is not strictly monotonous in N . In Appendix C we provide further
evidence of the sample comparison between groups' number of a liates and our index of complexity.
Another way to measure the complexity of the hierarchy developed by a Business Group could be
the explicit introduction of an edge entropy, i.e. considering the strength of the cross participations
as a further dimension to be included in the entropy index. In this case, the index would di er if an
a liate can be nally owned through direct participation (held by the headquarter) or indirect cross
participations (held by any other a liates in the control chain).23
However, given the scope of our analysis, the latter would not yield qualitatively di erent results,
as we only use data on business groups characterized by a majority threshold for control that includes
22
This can be easily veri ed by taking the rst derivative of Eq. 4 with respect to N or nl . Note that now the
maximum entropy is not reached when outcomes of states are equally likely (i.e. there is an equal number of a liates at
each level l). Rather, it is maximal when the group is pyramidal.
nl
23
n
In this case we could modify the index considering a joint probability distribution pij = pei pn
j , such that pj = N
el
e
as before and pi = E with el number of edges at level l and E total number of graph edges. The two events' probabilities
P PL
can be assumed as mutually independent, and hence we obtain the following index GIC = E
i
J pij log (1=pij ) where
@GIC
< 0; with nl ; el 2 N and nl > 1; el > 1, obtaining a decreasing marginal complexity in both nodes and edges,
@pij

provided that we have at least one subsidiary and one control link on each level.
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direct and indirect equity ties, in line with international business statistics. In terms of interpretation,
that is equivalent to assume that, once the group boundaries are identi ed through control, any
share above such a threshold would not signi cantly a ect the complexity of the organization, as the
headquarter would retain in any case the decision power.

4

Empirical results

4.1

Group boundaries and institutions

We begin our analysis by applying the empirical strategy developed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton
(2009) to our group-speci c and a liate-speci c measures of vertical integration.
We assume here that the coordinated management of a Business Group decides the organization
of production activities in two stages:

rst the group decides how much total vertical integration it

wants to achieve.24 Then, in a second stage, managers decide how to achieve the desired degree of
vertical integration, distributing it between a liates and headquarters and across a liates, also based
on the underlying hierarchical structure in which a liates are placed.25
We thus test for the drivers of Business Groups' boundaries in two nested steps, rst considering
the drivers of group-level vertical integration, and then testing for vertical integration at the a liate
level given the choice of vertical integration at the group-level, further controlling for the level of
hierarchical complexity. In the rst speci cation, we take as a dependent variable the measure of
group-level vertical integration (vgkc ) introduced in the previous section, which is speci c for each
group g located in country c and operating in a core industry k:
vgkc =
+

0

+

1 X cg

6 ln empg

+

+

2 Zcg

+

3 Xcg Zcg

7 ln gdpccg

+

k

+

4 GICg

+ "gkcg

+

5 mneg +

(5)

In this model, Xcg and Zcg are the two proxies for country-level contract enforcement and nancial
development already employed in Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009). They are respectively the
(opposite of) country-level average cost of a claim expressed as percentage of the total value of the
claim26 and the country-level ratio of private credit provided by all nancing institutions to GDP.27
Three controls for the characteristics of business groups are included. The rst is a proxy for the
group size (employment, empg ), obtained either directly from the heaquarter's balance sheet consolidated data, if available, or calculated summing up the employees of the headquarter and a liates.
24
At this stage we can assume that the group also decides where (at home or abroad) it wants to locate its activities,
a decision which we take as exogenous in this paper.
25
Although the latter is obviously a sempli cation of the coordination of managerial decisions within the group, we
nd support for this hypothesis in the nding by Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2012), according to which acquired
plants in US usually resemble the acquiring rms in terms of vertical integration. That is, they start shipping their
production to locations that their acquirers had already been shipping to, and they produce outputs that their acquirers
had already been manufacturing.
26
The cost in court fees and attorney fees, where the use of attorneys is mandatory or common, expressed as a
percentage of the debt value (World Bank, 2011a). The higher the cost the more di cult to enforce the contract. To
ease interpretation of results, we have taken the opposite of this variable.
27
Private credit by any nancing institution to GDP for 129 countries, sourced by the work of Beck and Demirg•
uc-Kunt
(2009), updated now regularly for the World Bank (2011b). This variable has been extensively used in some nance
literature, see for example Rajan and Zingales (1998).

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

19

19

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 784 [2013]

The second control is our entropy-like measure for hierarchical complexity (GICg ), which controls
for the fact that a higher level of vertical integration might be correlated to a more or less complex
corporate structure. Finally, a binary variable (mneg ) controls if each Business Group owns a liates
operating outside from his home country.
As in Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009), we also control for the potential endogeneity of
institutions to development, through the (log of) GDP per capita (gdpccg ) of the country where the
headquarter is located, assumed to be the country of origin (home country) of the business group.
A set of 3-digit NAICS industry xed e ects ( k ) is added to exclude that our results are the
consequence of a peculiar industrial composition. On that, note that even though Business Groups
can be active in more than one industry, we assign each group to the core 3-digit activity of their
headquarters, that is the activity which we have used as output in our index of vertical integration
where most of the value added is generated. Errors are clustered by country, and variables are
standardized to obtain beta coe cients. Nested results are reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Group-level vertical integration, group complexity and institutional constraints

Dependent variable :

I

II

III

IV

-.139***

-.114***

-.116***

(.037)

(.037)

(.037)

-.085***

-.070**

-.071**

(.035)

(.027)

(.028)

Group vertical integration
contract enforcement

financial development
contract enforcement*financial development

.023

.020

(.024)

(.024)

group complexity

.073***
(.024)

multinational

-.056
(.035)

(log of) group employment

-.003

.001

.003

.003

(.006)

(.006)

(.004)

(.003)

-.234***

-.229***

-.188***

-.185***

(.059)

(.079)

(.056)

(.057)

2.290***

2.247**

1.812***

1.838***

(.633)

(.818)

(.582)

(.583)

3-digit industry fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Errors clustered by country

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

222,433

222,433

222,433

222,433

(log of) GDP per capita
Constant

Observations (N. of Business Groups)
Industries

88

88

88

88

Countries

129

129

129

129

Adjusted R squared

.357

.361

.376

.377

*, **, *** signi cance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Beta coe cients and errors clustered
by country.

Results show that contracting and nancial conditions on a country-level are both signi cantly
and separately correlated with a group's vertical integration, even after controlling for industrial
composition. We nd in particular that a better contract enforcement reduces the scope for vertical
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integration, since in this case Business Groups can rely on external suppliers for the provision of
inputs with a lower probability that they renege on commitments. Similarly, our results also show
that a higher level of nancial development reduces the necessity to internalize production activities:
as credit constraints are less stringent thanks to the availability of better capital markets, outsourcing
outside the boundaries of the group is the preferred strategy.
These results are in line with the general priors of the literature and only slightly di erent from the
ones presented by Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009): in their case rm-level vertical integration at
the country-level was found to be positively correlated with the interaction term between contracting
instutions and nancial frictions (not signi cant in our case), while the individual variables in their
estimates were correctly signed (as in our case) but individually not-signi cant. We believe this
di erence in results is due to our choice of explicitly considering group a liation in the construction
of the vertical integration index.28 . It is not completely clear in existing literature how contractual and
nancial frictions combine together in determining the level of vertical integration. Here we presume
the perspective adopted by Acemoglu, Antras and Helpman (2007), who showed theoretically how
they can be complementary in the choice of the organizational form between a rm and its suppliers
(see also Hart and Moore, 1990, for a previous mention of this complementarity). According to them,
a rm faces a credit constraint when investing in a contractual relationship with its suppliers, because
it needs to pay upfront for that investment. But credit markets can be imperfect and in this case they
demonstrate that even in presence of a low cost of contracting, important nancial frictions can lead
to a choice of vertical integration.
Finally, we also nd that the level of total integration is not di erent for multinational and domestic
BGs, as the control in the last column of Table 4 con rms, which further strenghtens the idea that the
home country institutional environment is a powerful driver of the organization of a Business Group.
Given the ability of Business Groups to design vertical integration also across a liates, we nest the
above results in the vertical integration choice of each a liate, by estimating the following equation:
va(g)kc =

1 X ca

+

2 Zca

+

6 GICg Zca

+

7 vg

+

11 ln empa

+

12 ln empg

0

+

+

+

3 Xca Zca
8 vg Xca

+

k

+

+

4 GICg

9 vg Zca

+ "a(g)kca

+

+

5 GICg Xca +

10 ln gdpcca +

(6)

where in this case we take as dependent variable the a liate-speci c (a) vertical integration within
the gth group (va(g)kca ), de ned in Equation (5) as the average propensity to ship intermediate inputs
within the group network.
Each a liate is characterized by a core activity (k), where we assume most of value added is created
(even though the a liate can be involved in more than one primary and/or secondary activities), and
by a country (ca ) in which the a liate is located, possibly di erent from the country of origin of the
Business Group, in which case we will be dealing with a foreign a liate.29 Hence, the set of proxies
of institutional frictions (Xca , Zca ), their interaction and the (log) of GDP per capita (gdpcca ) now all
28
Indeed, in the robustness and sensitivity checks we present in Table 6, we report in Column 1 the results of the
above exercise carried out exactly as in AJM(09), that is ignoring the property linkages among rms when constructing
the vertical integration indexes. As in their case, we now also get correctly signed but poorly signi cant coe cients.
29
In Table 6 we will speci cally test for the robustness of our results when dealing with foreign a liates only.
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Table 5: A liate-level integration, group complexity and institutional constraints

Dependent variable :

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

-.128***

-.104**

-.094**

-.095**

(.061)

(.045)

(.043)

(.044)

(.043)

-.151***

-.138***

-.136***

-.140***

-.142***

(.040)

(.041)

(.039)

(.042)

(.038)

.018

.019

.018

.007

(.034)

(.033)

(.035)

(.031)

.079***

.075***

.068***

(.020)

(.022)

(.015)

group integration*contract enforcement

-.037***

-.018**

(.009)

(.008)

group integration*financial development

-.080***

-.070***

(.012)

(.006)

Affiliate integration within the group
contract enforcement

financial development
contract enforcement*financial development
group integration

group complexity

-.099**

-.012
(.014)

group complexity*contract enforcement

.019
(.015)

group complexity*financial development

.035***
(.011)

(log of) group employment
(log of) affiliate employment

-.002

-.002

-.002

(.004)

(.004)

(.003)

-.019

-.009

-.013

-.013

-.011

-.011

(.012)

(.009)

(.009)

(.008)

(.009)

(.008)

-.289***

-.163

-.146*

-.133*

-.148*

-.105

(.094)

(.100)

(.079)

(.071)

(.084)

(.069)

2.980***

1.671

1.502*

1.374*

1.384*

1.070

(.994)

(1.058)

(.824)

(.749)

(.751)

(.726)

3-digit industry fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Errors clustered by country

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

1,005,381

1,005,381

1,005,381

1,005,381

1,005,381

1,005,381

Industries

110

110

110

110

110

110

Countries

129

129

129

129

129

129

Adjusted R squared

.400

.402

.410

.415

.417

.421

(log of) GDP per capita
Constant

Observations (N. of affiliates)

*, **, *** signi cance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Beta coe cients and errors clustered by country.

refer to the a liate hosting country.
The inclusion of both the group index of complexity (GICg ) and the group vertical integration (vg )
as covariates is crucial in our setting to comprehend how business groups solve the trade-o between
vertical integration at the headquarter vs. a liate-level within a given institutional setting. For this,
we will also interact these two covariates with our proxies of institutional frictions.
Group-level and a liate-level employment (empa , empg ) in logs are also added as controls, as well
as a set of NAICS 3-digit industry xed e ects ( k ) that take into account potential di erences in the
industrial composition of the sample, while errors are clustered by country. Results are reported in
Table 5.
Similar to the results of the group-level speci cation, we observe that the a liate-level vertical
integration is negatively correlated with contract enforcement and nancial development: better institutions not only reduce the scope for total vertical integration, but also allow single a liates to be
relatively more specialized in the production of fewer inputs required by common production processes.
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We also nd that, on average, a liate and group integration are positively correlated, as similar environments lead the single a liate to resemble the parent group when designing its boundary, in line
with the ndings of Atalay et al. (2012).
The negative signs in the interaction terms between group integration and institutional quality
measures (column 5) point however to the idea that the better the institutions in a country, the higher
is the exibility of a group in selecting the degree of specialization of its a liates. In other words,
in 'good' institutional environments a liates are relatively less similar in terms of vertical integration
with respect to their group: a higher contract enforcement and/or a better nancial development allow
the single a liate to specialize more with respect to the group to which it belongs, thus exchanging
fewer inputs within the same group.
Finally, in column 6 of Table 5, we introduce as a further control our new metric of organizational complexity and its interaction with institutions. Results point at a potential trade-o in the
organizational design of a Business Group's boundaries between a liate integration and complexity:
controlling for the level of nancial development, the group can choose either to increase the degree of
vertical integration of each a liate in the group, and in turn reduce the hierarchical complexity of the
network; or it can rely on more `specialized' a liates, in this case organized within a more hierarchical
structure. Notably these results are in line with the case studies of GM and Mitsubishi, both showing
similar levels of group integration but a di erent degree of a liates' integration (less integrated in
the case of GM) vs. organizational complexity (with GM's a liates being placed in a relatively more
complex hierarchical structure).30
The latter ndings con rms the idea that within Business Groups vertical integration choices are
not independent from decisions on the organization of the hierarchy of rms across groups. Ignoring
this latent organizational variable when checking for the drivers of vertical integration of rms, as well
as the correlation between group and a liate level of vertical integration (e.g. considering all rms as
independent in a sample) might thus lead to an unobserved variable bias.
In Table 6 we present some tests of sensitivity of our results. In the

rst column, as already

discussed, we reproduce for our sample the original methodology by Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton
(2009). That is, we calculate the index of vertical integration for each rm as in AJM(09), i.e. assuming
that each rm's primary activities are its outputs while its secondary activities are internally produced
inputs, but ignoring the property linkages among

rms when constructing the vertical integration

measures, thus considering each rm as independent. Results show that, as expected, when omitting
the Business Group dimension the model is less well speci ed, and thus institutional variables lose
signi cance.
In the second column of Table 6 we restrict our sample only to a liates with more than 20
employees, in order to check if previous results are driven by the presence of a larger set of small
rms, in which vertical integration can be assumed to be negligible. Coe cients remain very similar
30

Clearly both vertical integration and organizational complexity can be endogenous to institutions: in an exercise not
reported here, we have tested the correlation between BG's organizational complexity and institutional frictions (controlling for industrial composition and rm-level characteristics), nding that the relationship is positive and signi cant
only in the case of nancial development. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no previous contribution
investigating the direction of causality between institutions, vertical integration and organizational complexity, nor we
have time-varying measures of the latter that allow for such a test. As such, the evidence reported here should be
interpreted as correlations.
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Table 6: Sensitivity of results: a liate-level vertical integration

Dependent variable :

AJM_09

> 20
employees

> 1 affiliate

domestic
affiliates

foreign
affiliates

Affiliate integration
contract enforcement

financial development
contract enforcement*financial development

-.042*

-.104**

-.094**

-.106**

(.024)

(.041)

(.042)

(.041)

(.026)

-.012

-.151***

-.149***

-.152***

-.101**

(.025)

(.037)

(.037)

(.038)

(.046)

.003

-.003

.003

.024

-.022

(.017)

(.028)

(.030)

(.031)

(.032)

.068***

.061***

.075***

.030***

(.015)

(.013)

(.025)

(.008)

-.012

-.016

-.008

-.014*

group integration
group complexity

-.054*

(.014)

(.014)

(.014)

(.006)

group integration*contract enforcement

-.020**

-.015*

-.013

-.006*

(.008)

(.008)

(.012)

(.002)

group integration*financial development

-.064***

-.064***

-.081***

-.028***

(.006)

(.006)

(.011)

(.006)

.018

.015

-.005

.004

(.015)

(.015)

(.015)

(.006)

.033***

.038***

.015**

.040*

(.011)

(.011)

(.007)

(.018)

group complexity*contract enforcement
group complexity*financial development
(log of) group employment
(log of) affiliate employment
(log of) GDP per capita
Constant

-.001

-.002

.005

-.001

(.004)

(.003)

(.004)

(.001)

-.003

-.012

-.010

-.012

-.003

(.004)

(.008)

(.008)

(.009)

(.007)

-.086**

-.088

-.096

-.130**

-.013

(.037)

(.068)

(.069)

(.064)

(.070)

.872**

.908

.979

1.321*

.046

(.376)

(.715)

(.725)

(.672)

(.074)

3-digit industry fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Errors clustered by country

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

1,005,381

831,319

875,727

748,453

256,928

Industries

110

110

110

108

109

Countries

129

129

129

129

129

Adjusted R squared

.215

.445

.422

.469

.291

Observations (N. of affiliates)

*, **, *** signi cance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Beta coe cients and errors clustered by country.

to previous results also in magnitude. In the third column we exclude the simplest Business Groups
characterized by only one a liate and one headquarter, to verify the extent to which results are driven
by the relatively large presence of groups of this kind in our sample: results are quite stable and all
previous comments can be considered valid.
Findings are also robust (albeit slightly less signi cant) also when considering separately foreign
a liates, as shown in the fourth column of Table 6. Part of this loss of signi cance can be explained by
the smaller variance we notice in the subsample of foreign a liates, since they are more similar than
domestic a liates in terms of vertical integration. On the other hand we can assume that, with respect
to the average a liate in our sample, a liates of multinational corporations are more in uenced by
organizational strategies developed in their country of origin, and hence relatively less in uenced in
their organizational design by host country characteristics.
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4.2

Group boundaries and performance

Another interesting dimension in the analysis of Business Groups is the relationship between vertical
integration and productivity. Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2012) have empirically investigated US
plant-level data showing that vertically integrated plants have on average higher productivity levels.
They also nd that this productivity premium re ected a cherry-picking e ect, with already more
e cient plants integrated ex post into more vertical structures.31
Consistently with these ndings, in Table 2 we have shown that also in our dataset rms that are
a liated to Business Groups (and thus to some extent vertically integrated) are on average bigger
and more productive than non-a liated rms. What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to
which di erent levels of vertical integration map into a di erent productivity of a liates, considering
that vertical integration for Business Groups is a multi-dimensional concept (at the headquarter vs.
a liates' level, and across a liates distributed along more or less complex hierarchies). To explore
these issues, we will thus test if the productivity levels of BGs' a liates are systematically correlated to
vertical integration and/or hierarchical complexity of the group, controlling for a number of additional
groups' characteristics.
In our speci cation we take as dependent variable (the log of) labor productivity (proda(g)kca )
calculated as value added per employee of each a liate a belonging to the gth group, operating in
core industry k and located in country ca .

ln proda(g)kca =
+

1 va(g)kca

+

2 vg

5 ln empa(g)kca

+

6 ln empg

0

+

+

3 GICg

+

+

4 hdista(g)kca

7 ln kla(g)kca

+

+

kca

5 f ora(g)kca +

+ "a(g)kca

(7)

A liate-level and group-level vertical integration (va(g)kca , vg ), as well as hierarchical complexity
(GICg ) with

= 1; 2 are included as covariates, together with the hierarchical distance (hdista(g)kca )

of each a liate a within group g. The latter is the level at which the single rm is located within
the network of a liates that form a Business Group, as depicted in Figure 1, and can be interpreted
as a control for the communication ability of the a liate with the center of decision represented by
the headquarter. Controls for capital intensity and size at the a liate level (empa(j)kca , kla(j)kca )
correct for the possible bias deriving from the use of a one-factor productivity indicator, at the same
time controlling for relation-speci c investments that a rm with a higher capital-intensive production
can undertake. Total employment is included as a control at the level of the group (empg ), together
with a full set of (country-per-industry) xed e ects (

kc ),

in order to neutralize at this stage of the

analysis all possible di erences in institutional environments combined with industrial composition
(here considered at the 3 digit level of disaggregation), and thus isolate as much as possible the e ects
of organizational design on a liates' performance. Errors are clustered at the headquarter level, to
account for within-group correlation. Nested results are presented in Table 7.
Looking at results, when we do not control for country

xed e ects, as in the

rst column of

31
For other works showing a positive correlation between vertical integration and productivity, see for example Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) or Schoar (2002), both investigating conglomerate rms. In both cases a selection e ect is
claimed to be responsible for the productivity di erences between integrated and non-integrated rms.
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Table 7, we obtain a negative correlation between vertical integration and productivity, both at the
group- and at the a liate-level. This is because Business Groups and their constituent

rms are

more vertically integrated in developing economies, where institutional frictions are more present and
rm performance is on average lower than in developed economies. On the other hand, including
country xed e ects, but excluding industry xed e ects (column 2 of Table 7), we nd a positive
correlation between both indexes of vertical integration and productivity, although in this case several
omitted variables can bias the correlation, among which the degree of market competition and the
speci c contractual completeness of the industry in which the rms operate. This is why starting from
column 3 we include country-per-industry xed e ects.
Table 7: Productivity levels and Business Groups' dimensions

Dependent variable :
log of (labor productivity)
affiliate integration

group integration
group complexity

OLS fe
(I)

OLS fe

OLS fe

OLS fe

OLS fe

OLS fe

(II)

(III)

(IV)

(V)

(VI)

-2.092***

.377***

.133**

.106*

.104*

.104*

(.085)

(.055)

(.059)

(.063)

(.063)

(.063)

-.587***

.239***

.055

.041

.035

.034

(.097)

(.050)

(.037)

(.039)

(.040)

(.041)

.062***

.020***

.009***

.038***

.041***

(.004)

(.003)

(.002)

(.005)

(.005)

-.002***

-.002***

group complexity^2
foreign

(.000)

(.000)

.283***

.256***

.246***

.250***

(.012)

(.012)

(.012)

hierarchical distance

(.012)
-.012***
(.004)

(log of) group employment

.073***

.027***

.019***

.015***

.013***

.013***

(.002)

(.002)

(.002)

(.002)

(.002)

(.002)

(log of) affiliate employment

.264***

-.037***

-.030***

-.020***

-.022***

-.022***

(.003)

(.003)

(.003)

(.003)

(.003)

(.003)

(log of) capital intensity

.264***

.171***

.181***

.181***

.180***

.180***

(.003)

(.003)

(.003)

(.003)

(.003)

(.003)

3.956***

4.337***

4.294***

4.295***

4.280***

4.295***

(.020)

(.016)

(.017)

(.015)

(.015)

(.015)

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Country fixed effects

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Country*industry fixed effects

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Constant

3-digit industry fixed effects

Errors clustered by headquarter
Observations (N. of affiliates)
N. of Business Groups

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

219,368

219,368

219,368

219,368

219,368

219,368

64,026

64,026

64,026

64,026

64,026

64,026

Industries

105

105

105

105

105

105

Countries

129

129

129

129

129

129

adjusted R_squared

.288

.164

.479

.487

.488

.488

*, **, *** signi cance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Errors clustered by headquarter.

Controlling for country-level heterogeneity combined with industrial composition (column 3), we
nd that only a liate vertical integration is associated to average a liates' productivity, while group
integration is not signi cant. The latter result is con rmed also controlling for foreign a liates (which
in turn, consistently with other ndings in the literature, are found to be some 25% more productive
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than the average rm). However, when also controlling for the hierarchical complexity of the group
(column 4), we nd that all the measures of vertical integration lose both signi cance and magnitude,
while group complexity appears to be positively and signi cantly related to productivity.
This result is partially in line with the evidence provided by Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2012)
in the case of US data, according to which much of the positive correlation between plant performance
and vertical ownership structures fades away when controlling for rm size as proxied by total revenues,
employment or number of establishments. In our strategy we can indeed distinguish between actual
(a liate or group) size, measured by (a liate or group) employment in the above speci cations,
and hierarchical complexity, being able to show that only after introducing this latter dimension the
correlation between a liates' productivity and vertical propensity fades away.32
Similarly to Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2012), we believe that the main economic rationale
that can explain at the same time a weak correlation between rm performance and vertical integration as well as a stronger positive correlation between productivity and organizational complexity
is to be found in the theoretical framework developed by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and
Garicano and Hubbard (2007). According to these works, intangible assets (such as best managers,
best managerial practices) are complementary to physical inputs involved in vertically linked products.
Therefore, given a rm size (in our case group size), best intangible assets can be shared in presence
of a larger number of units of production (in our case more complex hierarchies) and hence their costs
can be smoothed on a larger scale.33
In light of this theoretical framework, we assume that gains of productivity can derive both from
the exchange of intermediate inputs and from the exchange of intangible assets, with the latter channel
of transmission showing a higher signi cance from our data. The relevance of intangible assets is also
con rmed by looking at column 5 of Table 7, in which we include a squared term in hierarchical
complexity that appears with a negative and signi cant coe cient. The latter can be attributed to
coordination costs that arise when business networks become too complex to be managed e ciently.
This result is also in line with the microfoundation of organization provided by Caliendo and RossiHansberg (2012), in which a minimum e cient scale exists in the acquisition and communication of
knowledge throughout the hierarchy, associated to the emergence of endogenous communication costs
of additional management layers.
Although we do not have information on a group's minimum e cient scale of production, from our
estimates we can calculate the optimal threshold of complexity after which, ceteris paribus, returns
from hierarchical complexity start to decrease: this is quite large, as it corresponds to a GIC of around
9.5, associated to groups exceeding the number of 550 a liates and/or organized in control chains
with over 5 levels of hierarchical distance.34 Such an evidence of marginally decreasing returns from
32

In other words, in our data we are able to explicitely measure proprietary linkages among rms and their hierarchies,
while Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2012) limited their analysis to plants within rms, without an explicit control for
ownership structures.
33
Alternatively, we cannot exclude that the positive correlation between organizational complexity and a liates'
performance is driven by a higher degree of delegation of power as in Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012), according
to which more delegation within the rm is associated with a better allocation of resources. The latter would imply
that a more complex hierarchy in the chain of control, which we measure, is associated to a larger degree of managerial
delegation from the headquarters to the a liates, an assumption which we cannot however test, as internal delegation is
unobservable to us.
34
Note that our Group Index of Complexity is not strictly monotonous in mapping organizational forms, and thus a
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increasing complexity is relevant, as it puts a natural limit to the growth in complexity of business
groups: indeed, only 1% of groups in our sample (the critical value of GIC is around the 99th percentile
of its distribution) exceed this average `optimal' organizational threshold.
The same theoretical framework of Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) can also explain another
result we have obtained when distinguishing between hierarchical complexity (which takes into account
the overall density of a liates at each level of the control hierarchy) and the simple hierarchical
distance, i.e. the length of the command chain linking each a liate to the parent company. In
general, we

nd that the further the

rm is from the decision making center, the lower its level

of productivity appears to be; however, the latter result only holds when we control for our main
measure of organizational complexity. When considering only hierarchical distance in the model
(itself a raw proxy of organizational complexity), a liates located at further levels of control would
actually display higher levels of productivity. Our data are thus consistent with the idea that further
layers of management allow for the exploitation of economies of scale for knowledge inputs, and
hence a liates to bigger (more complex) networks are relatively more productive. At the same time,
subsidiaries located at further hierarchical distances from the headquarter discount a higher cost of
communication and show (at the margin) a negative productivity premium.

5

Conclusions

In this paper we have provided a preliminary comprehensive picture of the phenomenon of Business Groups across the globe, showing how BGs, although more numerous in developing economies,
constitute however a relevant share of economic activities also in developed countries.
By re ning traditional measures of vertical integration, we have shown how the decision process
related to the design of boundaries in Business Groups is truly multi-dimensional, as vertical integration choices are not independent from decisions on the organization of the hierarchy of rms across
groups, another feature of the organization of Business Groups for which we provide a novel metric.
Ignoring the correlations among these variables when checking for the drivers of vertical integration of
rms (e.g. considering all rms as independent in a sample, as the literature has been doing insofar)
might thus lead to an unobserved omitted variable bias.
Another interesting result of the analysis points at a positive and signi cant relationship between
organizational complexity and a liates' productivity (controlling for vertical integration), a nding
consistent with the theoretical framework by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Garicano and
Hubbard (2007), according to which intangible assets are complementary to physical inputs involved
in vertically linked products and a higher scale of production allows to smooth the costs of these best
inputs.
The relevance of intangible assets is also con rmed by the non-linear relation between complexity
and productivity that we

nd in the data, attributable to a trade-o

between the exploitation of

knowledge as an input and the communication of it down the hierarchy, a result further in line
with the work by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) and in general with previous literature on
knowledge-based hierarchies
given value can identify a range of cases with di erent combinations in terms of numbers of a liates or control levels.
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On the other hand we cannot exclude (but cannot test) an interpretation of this result in the
light of the ndings by Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012), according to which more delegation of
power within the rm is associated with a better allocation of resources. Clearly, here the delegation
of power has to be considered within the group, with additional layers of control across a liates (and
thus higher complexity) acting as a proxy for delegation.
A number of further lines of research stem from the above analysis. First of all, it is unclear if the
correlation between organization and productivity is the result of a cherry-picking process, in which
bigger and/or more complex business groups select rms with the better prospects on the market. To
recover some evidence on the latter direction of causality we have used a subset of our data for which
we have information on the date of acquisition of a rm by a Business Group. We have found that
the relation holds also using the growth rates of productivity, but due to the persistency over time of
the organizational complexity variable, more work needs to be undertaken in this direction.
A second line of research should investigate the country and industry variation in BGs' foreign
a liates to verify if and how a di erential in institutional constraints between origin and host countries
can shape organizational designs and nally a ect performance.
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Appendix A:
Corporate control and Business Groups from the Ownership Database (BvD)
Our two main sources of data are both compiled by Bureau Van Djik (BvD), a consulting rm, and
comprise the Ownership Database, from which we derive information on intra-group control linkages,
and the Orbis database, from which we retrieve companies' balance sheet information.
The Ownership Database, in particular, includes information on over 30 million shareholder/subsidiary
links for companies worldwide. Information on proprietary linkages is collected directly from single
companies, from o cial bodies when in charge, or from some national and international providers. In
Table A1 we include a list of the information providers, with the indication of the countries/areas they
cover, as reported by the Ownership Database. In case of con icting information among providers
covering the same country/area, the Ownership Database is updated according to the latest available
report.
Among the international providers, Bureau van Djik enlists also Dun & Bradstreet, a data source
that has already been exploited in other academic works mentioned in this paper (Acemoglu, Johnson
and Mitton, 2009; Alfaro et al., 2011; Alfaro and Charlton, 2009).

Table A1: Original sources of ownership linkages collected by Bureau Van Djik
CIBI Information, Inc. (Philippines), Creditreform (Bulgaria, Ukraine & Rep. of Macedonia) ,
Chamber of Commerce & Industry of Romania (Romania), CMIE (India), CFI Online (Ireland),
Creditreform-Interinfo (Hungary), Infocredit Group Ltd, (Cyprus & Middle East), CreditInform
(Norway), Creditreform Latvia (Latvia), Creditreform (Rep. of Macedonia), Informa Colombia SA
(Colombia), Contact database, Credinform (Russia & Kazakstan), Creditreform Austria (Austria),
Coface Slovenia (Slovenia), Dun & Bradstreet (USA, Canada, Latin America & Africa), DGIL
Consult (Nigeria), MarketLine, (previously Datamonitor), PT. Dataindo Inti Swakarsa (Indonesia),
DP Information Group (Singapore), Finar Enformasyon derecelendirme ve danismanlik hizmetleri
A.S (Turkey), Suomen Asiakastieto (Finland), Factset, Worldbox (Switzerland), Honyvem (Italy),
Creditreform Croatia (Croatia), Huaxia (China), Inforcredit Group (Cyprus), Informa del Peru
(Peru), ICAP (Greece), Informa (Spain), InfoCredit (Poland), Ibisworld (Australia), Jordans (UK,
Ireland), Patikimo Verslo Sistema (Lithuania), Krediidiinfo (Estonia), Købmandstandens
Oplysningsbureau (Denmark), KIS (Korea), LexisNexis (Netherlands), Bureau van Dijk
(Luxemburg), Creditreform Belgrade (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia & Montenegro), Coface MOPE
(Portugal), National Bank of Belgium (Belgium), Novcredit (Italy), Qatar Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (Qatar), Annual return (UK), Coface SCRL (France), Creditinfo Schufa GmbH (Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Iceland, Malta), SeeNews (Moldova, Albania, Georgia & Uzbekistan), Chinese
source, Statistics Canada (Canada), China Credit Information Service Ltd (Taiwan), Taiwan
Economic Journal (Taiwan), Teikoku Databank (Japan), Transunion (South Africa), UC (Sweden),
Verband der Vereine Creditreform (Germany), Worldbox (New Zealand, Hong Kong, Switzerland,
Monaco, Liechtenstein, Pakistan, Sri Lanka & Cuba)

The observation unit collected by the Ownership Database is the single link between a company
and each of its shareholders, with additional information on the total (direct and indirect) equity participation when relevant. There are 7,707,728 companies with information on shareholding structures
in the original database. An algorithm provided by Bureau van Dijk allows to identify in principle
the ultimate owners of a single company.
However, since our purpose is to track the whole network of rms developed by each Business Group
as de ned in Section 2.1 and model it as a hierarchical graph (see Figure 1), we have in principle to
depart from the complete shareholding structure of each company, in order to identify one ultimate
parent company, its set of a liates and their relative distance within the hierarchy. To that extent, we
slightly modify the original BvD algorithm in two ways: we reconcile con icting information that can
come from controlling and controlled subjects and we di erentiate between corporate and individual
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ultimate owners, recovering a total of 1,790, 062

rms which belong to Business Groups (270,474

parents and 1,519,588 a liates) according to our de nition.
Con icting information deriving from controlling and controlled subjects can arise in presence
of cross-participations. In accordance with international standards we apply a threshold criterion
(>50.01%) for the de nition of control on the basis of (direct and indirect) participation. The latter
is the methodology currently used across international institutions (OECD 2005; UNCTAD, 2009;
Eurostat, 2007), although it can lead to an overestimation of control in some bigger networks of
a liates.35 That is, it is possible to end up with one a liate controlled by more than one ultimate
parent company even after adopting a majority threshold. To solve that problem we can rely on
information o cially provided by companies' consolidated

nancial accounts, when available. In

particular, if we nd that an a liate is enlisted in more than one Business Group, we give priority to
the ultimate parent company that enlists that a liate in its consolidated accounts.
On the other hand, as the standard algorithm reports every property linkage between a company
and each of its shareholders, it includes as members of potential business groups (as previously de ned)
also a liates that are directly controlled by individual (non-corporate) shareholders, and that are not
controlling subjects of any other company. While we have excluded these cases from our sample,
we include in our analysis those corporate networks that involve at least one intermediate property
linkage of a corporate nature.36
More in detail, our modi ed algorithm partitions all rms for which information on ownership is
available preliminarly in two groups:
a) a set of independent companies, that have as controlling shareholder individuals or a family
or no speci c controlling entity, and that are not themselves controlling shareholders of any other
company;
b) all the other companies for which information on property linkages is available; these companies
are either owned by a corporate controlling (immediate) shareholder or are themselves independent,
but act as controlling shareholders of other companies.
We exclude the set a) of independent rms from our sample, and use it as a control group for
further empirical analysis (see below Table A3 for a description of this latter sample).
The algorithm then screen every

rm belonging to group b) for the highest total (direct and

indirect) participation in the equity of each company, as provided by the Ownership Database. Once
it

nds a corporate controlling entity A that sums up to more than 50.01% of control in a given

company B, company B is classi ed as an a liate, while the same algorithm checks the shareholding
structure of company A. If the latter is in turn ultimately owned by another corporate entity C, the
process is repeated until a controlling company that has no corporate controlling shareholder is found.
The latter is considered as the ultimate parent company of a liate companies A, B and C. In the case
of quoted companies, we consider as ultimate parent the highest company in the path of proprietary
linkages we can identify.
35

See Vitali et al. (2011) for an assessment of existing methodologies to attribute global corporate control and their
limits.
36
If for example an individual X directly controls a liates A and B, we do not consider the X-A-B network as a business
group. Whereas, in the case of an individual X that indirectly controls a liates C and D through a third company E,
we consider the E-C-D network as a Business Group, in which company E is the ultimate (corporate) owner.
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Having identi ed the set of a liates and their parent, the algorithm then assigns a hierarchical
level within each Business Group, counting from the parent how many steps of intermediate property
are required for ultimate control. In case the same a liate is encountered more than once in the same
path (due to cross-participations), we consider it as located on the farthest level where we have rst
encountered it.
A limit of the Ownership Database of Bureau Van Dijk concerns the maximum number of control
levels that can be obtained after considering cross-participations: the algorithm allows to reach a
maximum of 10 levels for a maximum of 1,000 a liates. However, in our data only 13 Business
Groups (that is 0.005% of our sample) exceed such limits. For these groups we can still obtain balance
sheet data for each a liate and the headquarter, but we cannot retrieve the position of each a liate
on the control chain. Hence, these 13 groups will be excluded from the empirical analysis involving
measurements of the hierarchical complexity.
As a result of our procedure to identify Business Groups, we can derive a control group that we
employ for a preliminary comparison of a liates to Business Groups and non-a liated rms along
di erent dimensions. From the above preliminary division in two groups of all rms for which we have
data in the Ownership Database, the group a) consists of 6,084,115 rms controlled by individuals or
families without control shares in any other company. Among them, however, for only 3,756,003 we
can retrieve nancial accounts that we use for the calculation of premia in Table 2.
In Table A2 we report some descriptive statistics of the control group collecting non-a liated rms
confronted with the set of a liates belonging to Business Groups.

Table A2: A control group of non-a liated rms, some descriptive statistics
Non-affiliated firms
Affiliates of BGs
Variables
Mean Median St. dev. Min Max
Mean Median St. dev. Min Max
Employment
13
4
51
1
14717
367
25
6225
1 1917456
Fixed assets
931
70 15016
1 4593066 109404
728 1812076
1 2.79E+08
Turnover (sales) 1464
279
4344
1
979128 119045
3493 1616124
1 3.57E+08
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Appendix B:
Correspondence table between US input output table and NAICS 2002
classi cation of industries

Table B1: Correspondence table NAICS 2002 and US BEA Input Output tables

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Industry description
Farms
Forestry, fishing, and related activities
Oil and gas extraction
Mining, except oil and gas
Support activities for mining
Utilities
Construction
Wood products
Nonmetallic mineral products
Primary metals
Fabricated metal products
Machinery
Computer and electronic products
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts
Other transportation equipment
Furniture and related products
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Food and beverage and tobacco products
Textile mills and textile product mills
Apparel and leather and allied products
Paper products
Printing and related support activities
Petroleum and coal products
Chemical products
Plastics and rubber products
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Air transportation
Rail transportation
Water transportation
Truck transportation
Transit and ground passenger transportation
Pipeline transportation
Other transportation and support activities
Warehousing and storage
Publishing industries (includes software)
Motion picture and sound recording industries
Broadcasting and telecommunications
Information and data processing services
Federal Reserve banks, credit intermediation, and
related activities
Securities, commodity contracts, and investments
Insurance carriers and related activities
Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles
Real estate
Rental and leasing services and lessors of intangible
assets
Legal services
Computer systems design and related services
Miscellaneous professional, scientific, and technical
services
Management of companies and enterprises
Administrative and support services
Waste management and remediation services
Educational services
Ambulatory health care services
Hospitals and nursing and residential care facilities
Social assistance
Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, and
related activities
Amusements, gambling, and recreation industries
Accommodation
Food services and drinking places
Other services, except government
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Input output codes
2002 NAICS codes
111CA
111, 112
113FF
113, 114, 115
211
211
212
212
213
213
22
22
23
23
321
321
327
327
331
331
332
332
333
333
334
334
335
335
3361MV
3361, 3362, 3363
3364OT
3364, 3365, 3366, 3369
337
337
339
339
311FT
311, 312
313TT
313, 314
315AL
315, 316
322
322
323
323
324
324
325
325
326
326
42
42
44RT
44, 45
481
481
482
482
483
483
484
484
485
485
486
486
487OS
487, 488, 492
493
493
511
511, 516
512
512
513
515, 517
514
518, 519
521CI
523
524
525
531

521, 522
523
524
525
531

532RL
5411
5415

532, 533
5411
5415

5412OP
55
561
562
61
621
622HO
624

5412-5414, 5416-5419
55
561
562
61
621
622, 623
624

711AS
713
721
722
81

711, 712
713
721
722
81
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Appendix C:
Sample properties of the Group Index of Complexity (GIC)
We had already argued in Section 5 how a simple counting of the number of a liates can be a poor
proxy for the complexity of the control chain developed by a Business Group, where the hierarchy
design can involve di erent dimensions and groups with the same number of a liates can eventually
come to display very di erent proprietary structures. Hence, we borrowed from graph theory a notion
of (probabilistic) entropy able to provide a synthetic measure for the similarity of hierarchical graphs
once assuming that Business Groups' control chains can be conveniently represented with a vertex
(here the headquarter) connected through edges (in our case control participations) to single nodes
(represented by a liates) for the purpose of a coordinated management of economic activities. Thereafter we argued that a change in the original node entropy was necessary to introduce an increasing
marginal complexity when a liates were added at a farther distance from the headquarter and we
discussed how this alteration modi ed consequently the properties of the original measure.
In this Appendix we want to show with further details how our Group Index of Complexity (GIC)
relates to both the number of a liates (N) and the original node entropy (H(G)) borrowed from graph
theory exploiting our dataset of Business Groups introduced in Section 3.
In Table C1 we report some descriptives that already show how both the node entropy in the
second column and the GIC in the third colum reproduce long right-tail distributions similar to the
more simple number of a liates but with some di erences. Skewness is much higher in the case of N,
while H(G) and GIC start increasing rapidly only after the 83rd percentile of our sample, di erently
from the distribution of N which already begins a right tail from the 75th percentile.

Table C1: Comparison of distributions: number of a liates, node entropy and GIC

Statistics
N
H(G)
Mean
5.62
standard deviation
32.62
Skewness
28.59
50th percentile
1
75th percentile
3
83th percentile
4
90th percentile
8
95th percentile
16
99th percentile
74
Maximum
1000*

GIC
0.18
0.43
2.43
0
0
0.41
0.92
1
1.83
3.27

0.35
1.02
5.34
0
0
0.68
1.45
1.88
4.7
19.07

*Maximum number of a liates for
which full proprietary linkages can
be retrieved in our sample, excluding
13 BGs for which
entropy

GIC and node

H(G) cannot be calculated.

Since until the 57th percentile our sample is represented by Business Groups having only one
a liate, both the node entropy and the GIC end up with null gures until that point of the distribution.
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper784
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However, given the logarithimic weight of formulas 3 and 4, also groups that have few a liates but
all positioned on a same proprietary level (N = nl ;whatever l) end ud with a H(G) and GIC that have
nal null gures until the 83rd percentile.
This last feature can be interpreted in terms of graph theory as a minimum complexity of the
hierarchical graph when nodes are all adjacent on a same level. From an economic point of view
it makes sense that Business Groups having a liates all located at the same proprietary distance
from the headquarter are more easily coordinated in the management of their activities. Moreover,
if we assume that control runs univocally from the headquarter to each single a liate, the cost of
maintaining a control chain with only one a liate and the cost of it where more a liates are however
located at the same level are virtually the same.
The previous is the reason why GIC (and node entropy) is not monotonic in the number of a liates,
since the GIC (and the node entropy) is additive in proprietary levels but not in number of a liates.
Groups with the same number of a liates can arrange them in one or more levels and the cost of
exerting control through the network is higher in the latter case.
In Table C2 we show however how sample distributions of GIC and N are signi cantly correlated
when we report descriptives of the rst by Business Groups'size classes

Table C2: Descriptives of GIC by size classes of Business Groups
N. affiliates
1-5
6-20
21-50
51-200
201-500
>500

Frequency (%) mean GIC median st dev
max
86.70
0.16
0.00
0.51
6.97
9.49
1.21
0.99
1.47
18.87
2.29
2.09
1.51
2.16
18.83
1.21
3.29
2.69
2.90
18.71
0.23
5.20
4.27
3.88
18.96
0.09
5.86
5.25
3.89
19.07

The average GIC and its median in the second column is indeed increasing from small groups that
have until ve a liates to bigger groups that report more than 500 a liates. Standard deviations
by size classes are also moderately increasing revealing that within each of them there is a certain
(increasing) degree of heterogeneity of organizational complexity of a liates along control chains,
con rming that GIC is more able to catch this heterogeneity in the hierarchy design. Indeed, in the
last column, where we report maximum GIC by size class, we do observe that even groups with only
ten a liates can show complex control chains comparable to bigger groups because, recalling entropy
properties introduced in Section 5, the GIC grows rapidly when more a liates are located on farther
levels37 .
One would like to graphically compare N and GIC to observe how they behave along our sample
distributions. Given their extremely long right tail, we resort to mean excess plots of Figure C1, where
graphs are the results of the following so called excess mean function (see Beirlant et al., 1996):
eF (u) = E (Y

u j Y > u)

(C1)

37

More precisely, given N number of a liates and L number of levels for each Business Group, the speci c GIC
reaches its maximum when m nNm = n nNn , for each m; n 2 L, nm and nn a liates on mth and nth level.
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where u 2 (xl ; xr ) where xl = inf fx : F (x) > 0g and xr = sup fx : F (x) < 1g.

Shortly, the mean excess plot gives back a transformation of the distribution such that it is repre-

sented as the excess of the consecutive sample means of a random variable Y with respect to a sequence
of threshold values u picked from the same domain of random variable Y such that the cumulative
distribution F (x) is de ned on the interval (0; 1). More analitically, we can describe the mean excess
function as:
1
eF (u) =
F (u)

Z1

F (y)dy

(C2)

u

with distributions of random variable Y on [0; 1).

In our speci c case, mean excess plots in Figure C1 depart from the rst threshold value u di erent

from zero from our sample of Business Groups (1 in the case of N and 0:12 in the case of GIC). The
values at which the mean excess functions are maximum are 271 for random variable N and 2.89 for
random variable GIC.

Figure C1: A visual comparison of number of a liates (N) and GIC distributions: mean
excess functions

In both cases, we observe that after the maximum of the mean excess function, the distributions
are steepily decreasing almost linearly, con rming that they have a long right-tail that is very much
similar from a statistical point of view. However, on the left tail of the distribution, number of a liates
and GIC behave di erently, where some points of discontinuity are present for the GIC excess function
Those discontinuities reveal that at some lower measures of organizational complexity there is a high
portion of Business Groups from our sample, a feature that was not observed when looking at the
more simple group size in terms of number of a liates.
Finally, in Figure C2 we report the quantile-quantile plot of GIC against N, in order to observe
graphically how they behave with respect to each other by percentiles. The graph shows that for
intermediate number of a liates, GIC has a smoother distribution especially once approaching groups
that have a higher number of a liates, being able to give them a continuous measure that take into
account their organization along the value chain. Business Groups with, say, about a thousand of
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper784
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a liates can show a di erent GIC, however higher with respect to smaller groups if a liates are
located at increasing levels from the headquarter.

Figure C2: A quantile-quantile plot of number of a liates (N) vs GIC
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